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OPINION  
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
Appellant Ferring Pharmaceuticals, Inc. appeals from a 
District Court order denying its motion for a preliminary 
injunction against appellee Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
1
  
This appeal requires us to determine, inter alia, whether a 
party seeking a preliminary injunction pursuant to a Lanham 
Act claim is entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm.  
We conclude that, in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions 
in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), 
and Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 
U.S. 7 (2008), a party bringing a claim under the Lanham Act 
is not entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm when 
seeking a preliminary injunction and must demonstrate that 
irreparable harm is likely.  We also conclude that the District 
Court did not err in finding that Ferring failed to demonstrate 
irreparable harm.  We will, therefore, affirm the District 
Court’s order.  
 
I. 
 
A. 
 
                                              
1
 Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. is now known as Actavis, Inc.  
However, the parties refer to Watson in their briefs, and we 
will do so as well for ease of reference.    
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 Ferring and Watson are pharmaceutical companies that 
market competing prescription progesterone products.  
Progesterone is a hormone that plays a key role in helping 
women become pregnant and maintain their pregnancies, 
specifically by preparing the uterine lining for the embryo and 
maintaining the lining to support the embryo during the early 
stages of pregnancy.  Although women naturally produce 
progesterone, women seeking to become pregnant through 
assisted reproductive technology (“ART”) procedures, such 
as in vitro fertilization, generally require progesterone 
supplementation.  Historically, women have received 
progesterone through intramuscular shots, which are not 
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) and 
which patients consider painful.  Ferring and Watson each 
manufacture a product that administers progesterone to 
women through vaginal inserts rather than intramuscular 
shots.  Ferring’s product, Endometrin, is delivered in capsule 
form and applied two or three times per day.  Watson’s 
product, Crinone, is a gel delivered via applicator and is 
applied once daily.  Endometrin and Crinone are currently the 
only two vaginal progesterone inserts for ART approved by 
the FDA.   
 
 Ferring’s claims arise out of two presentations made 
by Watson on September 11, 2012.  On that date, Watson 
hosted and invited doctors and healthcare professionals to 
view two presentations about Crinone made by Dr. Kaylen M. 
Silverberg, a paid consultant.  The presentations were 
streamed online at 7:30 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. throughout the 
United States and viewed by medical professionals in-person 
and over the Internet with a password.  The webcasts were 
designed to encourage attendees to purchase Crinone and 
consisted of a series of PowerPoint slides prepared by 
Watson.   
 
 During the presentations, Dr. Silverberg made three 
statements with which Ferring takes issue:  (1) he referenced 
a “Black Box” warning on Endometrin’s package insert; (2) 
he discussed a patient preference survey comparing Crinone 
and Endometrin; and (3) he mischaracterized the results of 
certain studies of Endometrin’s effectiveness in women over 
the age of thirty-five. 
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1. 
 
 First, during the 7:30 webcast, Dr. Silverberg stated 
that “if you read the package insert, for Endometrin there is a 
black box warning showing the efficacy has not been 
demonstrated with . . . patients 35 years of age and older.”  
Appendix (“App.”) 174-75.  A Black Box warning is of 
special note in the medical community, as it signifies that 
medical studies indicate that the drug carries a significant risk 
of serious or life-threatening effects.  See 21 C.F.R. § 
201.57(c)(1) (providing that “[c]ertain contraindications or 
serious warnings, particularly those that may lead to death or 
serious injury, may be required by the FDA to be presented in 
a box”).  The package insert does state that “[e]fficacy in 
women 35 years of age and older has not been clearly 
established.”  App. 6.  However, that statement is not 
contained in a Black Box warning on the package insert.  
Watson admits that Dr. Silverberg’s statement was, therefore, 
made in error.  Watson Br. 8.     
 
 Dr. Silverberg was alerted to the inaccuracy of his 
characterization of the statement as a Black Box warning after 
the 7:30 webcast, and the 9:00 webcast did not contain such a 
statement.  Dr. Silverberg also certified to Ferring and to the 
District Court that he would not repeat this statement in the 
future.   
 
2. 
 
 During the two presentations, Dr. Silverberg also told 
the audience that high percentages of women preferred 
Crinone to Endometrin.  Specifically, during the 7:30 
webcast, Dr. Silverberg stated: 
 
When you look at Crinone compared to 
Endometrin, similar findings.  94 percent of 
patients thought that Crinone was easier to 
incorporate into their daily lifestyle, probably 
because it’s given once a day compared to three 
times a day for Endometrin, 82 percent thought 
that it was more convenient, or I’m sorry, that 
may be 88 percent, 94 percent thought that it 
5 
 
was more comfortable to use Crinone than the 
Endometrin.   
 
App. 175.  During the 9:00 webcast, Dr. Silverberg 
stated:  
 
Now looking at Crinone compared to 
Endometrin, telephone survey, 94 percent of 
patients thought that Crinone was easier to 
incorporate into a daily lifestyle than the 
Endometrin given three times a day.  88 percent 
thought it was more convenient.  84 percent 
thought it was more comfortable to use.   
 
App. 182-83.      
 
 The slide used by Dr. Silverberg during the 
presentations states that these percentages are based on a 
survey of women who used Crinone or Endometrin.  The 
slide also states that the percentages are derived from a “tally 
of yes/no questions about whether CRINONE was easy to 
incorporate into a daily lifestyle, was convenient, and was 
comfortable to use.”  App. 376.  Thus, the text of the slide 
indicated that the survey was not actually a comparison of 
Crinone and Endometrin.  Watson has admitted that Dr. 
Silverberg’s claims were false, because the figures cited were 
not based on a survey comparing patient preferences for 
Crinone and Endometrin.
2
  Watson Br. 9-10.  Dr. Silverberg 
certified to the District Court that he was aware of his mistake 
in misreading the survey results and will not repeat it in the 
future.   
 
3. 
 
 Dr. Silverberg also made several statements regarding 
the efficacy of Crinone and Endometrin in women over thirty-
five years of age.  Dr. Silverberg stated that “if you read the 
package insert, for Endometrin there is a black box warning 
                                              
2
 Watson asserts that other data from the survey did show that 
“patients preferred Crinone over Endometrin by a two-to-one 
margin” but acknowledges that “the figures were not identical 
to the ones Dr. Silverberg recited.”  Watson Br. 10; App. 312.   
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showing the efficacy has not been demonstrated with . . . 
Endometrin for patients 35 years of age and older,” App. 174-
75 (emphasis added), but Endometrin’s package insert 
actually states that “[e]fficacy in women 35 years of age and 
older has not been clearly established,” App. 6 (emphasis 
added).    
 
 In addition, Dr. Silverberg discussed studies performed 
by Schoolcraft WB, et al.,
3
 and Doody KJ, et al.,
4
 concerning 
the use of Crinone and Endometrin in women over thirty-five 
years of age.  App. 191, 193-98.  During the 7:30 webcast, 
Dr. Silverberg stated: 
 
We know that efficacy has been established for 
Crinone in patients under the age of 35 as well 
as over the age of 35.  Schoolcraft’s analysis of 
the Doody study and also our study found the 
exact same thing.   
 
App. 176.  During the 9:00 webcast, Dr. Silverberg stated:  
 
The efficacy of Crinone, unlike the other 
products, has been established in women 
throughout the entire reproductive spectrum 
from 22 to 47, including women age 35 years of 
age and older.  Schoolcraft’s study found that, 
our study found that.   
 
App. 184.  He also stated, during the same webcast:  
 
Bill Schoolcraft has some published data 
showing that in fact that the efficacy of 
Endometrin given three times a day is not — it 
                                              
3
 See Schoolcraft WB, et al., Efficacy of a novel form of 
vaginal progesterone on continuing pregnancy rates in women 
undergoing IVF with elevated BMI and advanced age, 87 
Fertility & Sterility S24 (2007).   
4
 See Doody KJ, et al., Endometrin for luteal phase support in 
a randomized, controlled, open-label, prospective in-vitro 
fertilization trial using a combination of Menopur and 
Bravelle for controlled ovarian hyperstimulation, 91 Fertility 
& Sterility 1012 (2009).   
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was not found to be efficacious for women over 
the age of 35. 
 
App. 183. 
 
 The Schoolcraft study involved the administration of 
Endometrin twice or three times a day or Crinone to 
participants who were up to forty-two years old.  The study 
lists the results for the participants who took Crinone, but the 
data analysis section and conclusion concern only 
Endometrin.  The study concludes that “Endometrin was well 
tolerated and provided successful luteal support in poor-
prognosis patients” such as “those older than 35.”  App. 191.  
However, the study also includes a chart comparing the 
results for the participants taking Endometrin with the 
participants taking Crinone, and the chart indicates that 
Crinone has higher pregnancy rates than Endometrin for 
participants over the age of thirty-five.   
 
 The Doody study, structured similarly to the 
Schoolcraft study, directly compared Endometrin to Crinone 
and concludes that “[n]o clinically meaningful differences 
were observed across the three treatment groups in pregnancy 
rates or live birth rates,” and that “Endometrin provides a 
safe, well tolerated, and effective method for providing luteal 
phase support in women undergoing IVF.”  App. 197.   
 
 Dr. Silverberg has certified that in future presentations 
concerning Crinone, he will make only specified statements 
as to the efficacy of Endometrin for women thirty-five years 
old or older in accordance with the statement contained on the 
product’s package insert.   
 
B. 
 
 On September 17, 2012, Ferring filed a complaint 
pursuant to section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(a), the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 56:8-1 et seq., and New Jersey common law, alleging, inter 
alia, that Watson’s statements at the presentations were false 
and misleading.  On November 9, 2012, Ferring moved for a 
preliminary injunction to enjoin Watson from making further 
false statements and for corrective advertising.   
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 The District Court denied Ferring’s motion on April 4, 
2013.  Of particular note, the District Court found that Ferring 
was not entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm in 
seeking a preliminary injunction.  Without this presumption, 
the District Court found that Ferring had failed to present 
sufficient evidence to demonstrate a likelihood of irreparable 
harm, and, accordingly, Ferring was not entitled to a 
preliminary injunction.  The District Court also briefly 
addressed the likelihood of the success of Ferring’s claims on 
the merits, noting that it was not clear, at the preliminary 
injunction stage, that Watson’s allegedly false statements 
were “completely unsubstantiated” because Watson 
demonstrated that at least some support does exist to form the 
basis of the challenged statements.  App. 14.  However, the 
District Court stated that it did not need to make a 
determination as to the likelihood of success of Ferring’s 
claims in light of Ferring’s failure to demonstrate irreparable 
harm.   
 
 Ferring timely appealed.   
 
II. 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this action 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367, and this Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292.   
 
 We review the District Court’s decision to grant or 
deny a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion.  
Highmark, Inc. v. UPMC Health Plan, Inc., 276 F.3d 160, 
170 (3d Cir. 2001).  The District Court’s findings of fact are 
reviewed for clear error and its conclusions of law are subject 
to plenary review.  Id.
5
 
                                              
5
 Ferring argues, citing E.T. Browne Drug Co. v. Cococare 
Products, Inc., 538 F.3d 185, 196 (3d Cir. 2008), that where, 
as here, the district court did not conduct an evidentiary 
hearing in a Lanham Act case, the standard of review is 
plenary.  However, E.T. Browne does not stand for that 
proposition.  Rather, this Court in E.T. Browne observed that 
it was required to apply a plenary standard of review to a 
summary judgment ruling and distinguished this from a ruling 
9 
 
III. 
 
 Preliminary injunctive relief is an “extraordinary 
remedy, which should be granted only in limited 
circumstances.”  Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson 
& Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm. Co., 290 F.3d 578, 586 
(3d Cir. 2002) (quotation marks omitted).  “A plaintiff 
seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is 
likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer 
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the 
balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is 
in the public interest.”  Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.  The “failure 
to establish any element . . . renders a preliminary injunction 
inappropriate.”  NutraSweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Enters., Inc., 176 
F.3d 151, 153 (3d Cir. 1999).  The movant bears the burden 
of showing that these four factors weigh in favor of granting 
the injunction.  See Opticians Ass’n of Am. v. Indep. 
Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 1990).    
 
 Ferring takes issue with the District Court’s analysis of 
the irreparable harm prong in deciding its motion for a 
preliminary injunction.  It argues that irreparable harm can 
and should be presumed in Lanham Act comparative false 
advertising cases, and that the District Court erred in 
declining to afford Ferring that presumption and in denying it 
a preliminary injunction.  Watson responds that:  (1) this 
Court has never recognized such a presumption; (2) even if 
such a presumption once existed, it no longer does in light of 
the Supreme Court’s decisions in eBay, 547 U.S. 388, and 
Winter, 555 U.S. 7; and (3) without that presumption, Ferring 
failed to demonstrate a likelihood of irreparable harm.  We 
address these contentions below. 
 
A. 
 
 This Court has never held that a plaintiff seeking a 
preliminary injunction pursuant to a Lanham Act false 
advertising claim is entitled to a presumption of irreparable 
harm.  However, prior to eBay, several of our sister courts 
                                                                                                     
on a motion for a preliminary injunction (which, in that case, 
took place after a four-day evidentiary hearing), for which the 
weighing of evidence is reviewed for clear error.  Id.   
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had applied a presumption of irreparable harm upon a 
showing of likelihood of success on the merits where a 
plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction in a comparative false 
advertising case.  See, e.g., Southland Sod Farms v. Stover 
Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1146 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that 
for false comparative advertising claims, the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit has held that “[p]ublication of 
deliberately false comparative claims gives rise to a 
presumption of actual deception and reliance” (quotation 
marks omitted)); Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 
F.2d 6, 16 (7th Cir. 1992) (referencing the “well-established 
presumption that injuries arising from Lanham Act violations 
are irreparable, even absent a showing of business loss”); 
McNeilab, Inc. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 848 F.2d 34, 38 
(2d Cir. 1988) (affirming the district court’s presumption of 
irreparable harm from a finding of false or misleading 
advertising).  
 
 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s 
reasoning for applying this presumption in McNeilab is 
instructive.  See 848 F.2d at 38.  There, the court explained 
that  
 
[a] misleading comparison to a specific 
competing product necessarily diminishes that 
product’s value in the minds of the consumer.  
By falsely implying that Advil is as safe as 
Tylenol in all respects, AHP deprived McNeil 
of a legitimate competitive advantage and 
reduced consumers’ incentive to select Tylenol 
rather than Advil.  This is analogous to a 
Lanham Act trademark dispute.  An infringing 
mark, by its nature, detracts from the value of 
the mark with which it is confused.  In that 
context, we recently confirmed that irreparable 
harm will be presumed.  Consequently, the 
district court did not err in presuming harm 
from a finding of false or misleading 
advertising.      
 
Id. (citations omitted); see also Abbott Labs., 971 F.2d at 16 
(“This presumption, it appears, is based upon the judgment 
that it is virtually impossible to ascertain the precise 
11 
 
economic consequences of intangible harms, such as damage 
to reputation and loss of goodwill, caused by such 
violations.”).  The justification for applying this presumption, 
therefore, is twofold:  (1) a misleading or false comparison to 
a specific competing product necessarily causes that product 
harm by diminishing its value in the mind of the consumer, 
similar to trademark infringement cases; and (2) the harm 
necessarily caused to reputation and goodwill is irreparable 
because it is virtually impossible to quantify in terms of 
monetary damages. 
 
 Although we have not applied a presumption of 
irreparable harm to a false advertising case, we have 
repeatedly held, prior to eBay and Winter, that a plaintiff 
alleging a Lanham Act trademark infringement claim is 
entitled to a presumption of harm when she demonstrates a 
likelihood of success on the merits.
6
  See Kos Pharm., Inc. v. 
Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 726 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that 
“trademark infringement amounts to irreparable injury as a 
matter of law” (quotation marks omitted)); see also Opticians, 
920 F.2d at 196.  In Opticians, we concluded that trademark 
infringement constitutes a per se injury because it inhibits the 
owner’s “ability to control its own . . . marks, which in turn 
creates the potential for damage to its reputation.  Potential 
damage to reputation constitutes irreparable injury for the 
purpose of granting a preliminary injunction in a trademark 
case.”  920 F.2d at 196; see also S & R Corp. v. Jiffy Lube 
Int’l, Inc., 968 F.2d 371, 378 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that 
“[g]rounds for irreparable injury include loss of control of 
reputation, loss of trade, and loss of goodwill” and 
“trademark infringement amounts to irreparable injury as a 
matter of law”).  Accordingly, prior to eBay and Winter, we 
applied a presumption of irreparable harm in Lanham Act 
trademark infringement cases in which a plaintiff sought a 
                                              
6
 Trademark infringement and false advertising claims both 
arise under section 43(a)(1) of the Lanham Act, see 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(a), and courts often rely on trademark infringement 
precedent in deciding false advertising cases, as both types of 
cases address irreparable injuries in the form of reputational 
harm and loss of goodwill.  See, e.g., McNeilab, 848 F.2d at 
38 (analogizing false comparative advertising claims to 
trademark disputes with regard to the type of harm caused).   
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preliminary injunction, and our reasoning for doing so has 
been the basis for other courts’ decisions in comparative false 
advertising cases:  a false statement about a product in 
comparison to another creates the potential for damage to the 
product or brand’s reputation, which constitutes irreparable 
injury that is difficult to quantify.  See McNeilab, 848 F.2d at 
38.     
 
B. 
 
 The Supreme Court revisited the analytical framework 
governing injunctions in two significant cases from the last 
decade:  eBay and Winter.  The ramifications of these 
decisions have been considered by many of our sister Courts 
of Appeals.    
 
eBay was a patent case in which MercExchange, 
holder of a business method patent for an electronic market, 
sued eBay and a subsidiary for patent infringement.  See 
eBay, 547 U.S. at 390.  A jury found that MercExchange’s 
patent was valid and had been infringed, and that an award of 
damages was appropriate.  Id. at 390-91.  Following the 
verdict, the district court denied MercExchange’s motion for 
permanent injunctive relief, “adopt[ing] certain expansive 
principles suggesting that injunctive relief could not issue in a 
broad swath of cases” and specifically “conclud[ing] that a 
‘plaintiff’s willingness to license its patents’ and ‘its lack of 
commercial activity in practicing the patents’ would be 
sufficient to establish that the patent holder would not suffer 
irreparable harm if an injunction did not issue.”  Id. at 393 
(quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 
2d 695, 712 (E.D. Va. 2003)).  The Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit reversed, applying its “‘general rule that 
courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent 
infringement absent exceptional circumstances.’”  Id. at 391 
(quoting MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 
1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).  The Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit cited Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co. for this 
proposition, which arose out of the historical practice in the 
Federal Circuit that “‘[i]n matters involving patent rights, 
irreparable harm has been presumed when a clear showing 
has been made of patent validity and infringement.’”  
Richardson, 868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (quoting 
13 
 
H.H. Robertson Co. v. United Steel Deck, Inc., 820 F.2d 384, 
390 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).    
 
The Supreme Court vacated the decision and remanded 
to the district court, holding that the Court of Appeals erred in 
applying a categorical rule that injunctions should issue upon 
a showing of valid patent infringement.  eBay, 547 U.S. at 
394.  The Court held that a patent infringement plaintiff must 
fulfill the traditional requirements for a permanent injunction.  
Id. at 391.  The Court observed that the Patent Act “expressly 
provides that injunctions may issue in accordance with the 
principles of equity,” and, accordingly, “a major departure 
from the long tradition of equity practice should not be lightly 
implied.”  Id. at 391-92 (quotation marks omitted).  The Court 
also noted that in copyright cases, it had “consistently 
rejected invitations to replace traditional equitable 
considerations with a rule that an injunction automatically 
follows a determination that a copyright has been infringed.”  
Id. at 392-93 (citing cases).   
 
The Court held that neither the district court nor the 
Court of Appeals “fairly applied these traditional equitable 
principles in deciding respondent’s motion for a permanent 
injunction,” because the district court applied a categorical 
rule in denying relief, while the Court of Appeals applied a 
categorical rule in granting injunctive relief.  Id. at 393-94.  
Accordingly, the Court remanded to the district court, holding 
that “the decision whether to grant or deny injunctive relief 
rests within the equitable discretion of the district courts, and 
. . . such discretion must be exercised consistent with 
traditional principles of equity, in patent disputes no less than 
in other cases governed by such standards.”  Id. at 394.7   
                                              
7
 Although the Court rejected the application of categorical 
rules that would eliminate the use of the traditional four-
factor test, two concurrences, written by Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justice Kennedy, respectively, and separately joined by a 
total of seven Justices, suggested that such rules might 
survive as “lesson[s] of . . . historical practice” that might 
inform the district courts’ equitable discretion “when the 
circumstances of a case bear substantial parallels to litigation 
the courts have confronted before.”  Id. at 395-97, (Kennedy, 
14 
 
    Subsequently, in Winter, the Supreme Court addressed 
the standard for demonstrating irreparable harm in the 
preliminary injunction context.  See 555 U.S. at 20-24.  
There, several environmental organizations sought a 
preliminary injunction against the Navy’s use of sonar in 
training exercises, alleging that it would cause serious harm 
to various species of marine mammals.  Id. at 13-14.  The 
Court rejected the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding that “when a plaintiff demonstrates a strong 
likelihood of prevailing on the merits, a preliminary 
injunction may be entered based only on a ‘possibility’ of 
irreparable harm.”  Id. at 21.  The Court “agree[d] with the 
Navy that the Ninth Circuit’s ‘possibility’ standard is too 
lenient.  [The Court’s] frequently reiterated standard requires 
plaintiffs seeking preliminary relief to demonstrate that 
irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.”  
Id. at 22.  The Court also noted that “[i]ssuing a preliminary 
injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable harm is 
inconsistent with our characterization of injunctive relief as 
an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a 
clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”  Id.  
 
 Several of our sister courts, although not this Court, 
have addressed the ramifications of these decisions for the 
irreparable harm prong of the preliminary injunctive relief 
analysis, uniformly holding that application of a presumption 
of irreparable harm is no longer permissible, for instance, in 
patent and copyright infringement cases.        
 
 In 2011, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
held that, in patent cases, eBay “jettisoned the presumption of 
irreparable harm as it applies to determining the 
appropriateness of injunctive relief.”  Robert Bosch LLC v. 
Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  The 
court acknowledged that eBay “did not expressly address the 
presumption of irreparable harm.”  Id. at 1148.  However, the 
court held that extension of the reasoning of eBay required 
elimination of the presumption, observing that “[i]n eBay, the 
Supreme Court made clear that ‘broad classifications’ and 
                                                                                                     
J., concurring); see also id. at 394-95 (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring). 
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‘categorical rule[s]’ have no place in [the injunction] 
inquiry,” but rather “courts are to exercise their discretion in 
accordance with traditional principles of equity.”  Id. (quoting 
eBay, 547 U.S. at 393-94).   
 
 The Courts of Appeals for the Second and Ninth 
Circuits have extended the eBay  analysis to copyright cases.  
In Salinger v. Colting, a copyright case in which the plaintiff 
sought a preliminary injunction, the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit held that eBay abrogated the presumption of 
irreparable harm in copyright cases.  See 607 F.3d 68, 76-78 
(2d Cir. 2010).  The court began by observing that it had 
traditionally “presumed that a plaintiff likely to prevail on the 
merits of a copyright claim is also likely to suffer irreparable 
harm if an injunction does not issue.”  Id. at 75.  It then 
discussed the ways it had historically interpreted and applied 
the presumption:  (1) as allowing a plaintiff likely to prevail 
on the merits to make a less “detailed showing of irreparable 
harm”; (2) “as though it applies automatically and is 
irrebuttable”; and (3) as rebuttable “where the plaintiff 
delayed in bringing the action seeking an injunction.”  Id.  
However, the court observed that “[u]nder any of these 
articulations,” it had “nearly always issued injunctions in 
copyright cases as a matter of course upon a finding of 
likelihood of success on the merits.”  Id. at 76.   
 
 The Salinger court held that the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning “applie[d] with equal force (a) to preliminary 
injunctions (b) that are issued for alleged copyright 
infringement.”  Id. at 77.  The court closely examined eBay, 
noting that “nothing in the text or the logic of eBay suggests 
that its rule is limited to patent cases.  On the contrary, eBay 
strongly indicates that the traditional principles of equity it 
employed are the presumptive standard for injunctions in any 
context.”  Id. at 77-78.  The also court noted that this holding 
was consistent with the Supreme Court’s construction of the 
preliminary injunction standard in Winter.  See id. at 79.   
 
        The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has also 
explicitly interpreted eBay to mean that the Supreme Court 
intended that the propriety of injunctive relief in copyright 
cases “be evaluated on a case-by-case basis in accord with 
traditional equitable principles and without the aid of 
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presumptions or a ‘thumb on the scale’ in favor of issuing 
such relief.”  Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 653 F.3d 976, 
980-81 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson 
Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 157 (2010)).     
 
C. 
 
 We now turn to the effect of eBay and Winter in 
Lanham Act cases.  We hold that although eBay in particular 
arose in the patent context, its rationale is equally applicable 
in other contexts, including cases arising under the Lanham 
Act, for the reasons that follow.
8
   
 
 The Lanham Act’s injunctive relief provision is 
premised upon traditional principles of equity, like the Patent 
Act’s.  Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (Lanham Act) (“The 
several courts vested with jurisdiction of civil actions arising 
under this chapter shall have power to grant injunctions, 
according to the principles of equity and upon such terms as 
the court may deem reasonable . . . .” (emphasis added)), with 
35 U.S.C. § 283 (Patent Act) (“The several courts having 
jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant injunctions in 
accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the 
violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the 
court deems reasonable.” (emphasis added)).  Accordingly, 
we should interpret this nearly identical wording in the same 
way.  See N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 
F.3d 1211, 1228 (11th Cir. 2008).  Notably, the Court in eBay 
suggested that a “major departure from the long tradition of 
equity practice” should be permitted only to the extent that 
“Congress intended such a departure,” and the language of 
these two acts makes clear that Congress did not intend any 
such departure in these contexts.  547 U.S. at 391-92 
(quotation marks omitted).  
 
 In addition, like the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, we believe the logic of eBay is not limited to patent 
cases but rather is widely applicable to various different types 
of cases.  See Salinger, 607 F.3d at 78 n.7 (“[W]e see no 
                                              
8
 As will be discussed infra, Winter, by its terms, applies to 
the instant case, as it addressed the standard for preliminary 
injunctions generally.  See 555 U.S. at 22.   
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reason that eBay would not apply with equal force to an 
injunction in any type of case.”).  Indeed, the Supreme Court 
has applied the reasoning of eBay in a substantially distinct 
context.  In Monsanto Co v. Geertson Seed Farms, a case 
involving violations of the National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969 (“NEPA”), the Court rejected the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s holding that “an injunction is 
the proper remedy for a NEPA violation except in unusual 
circumstances.”  561 U.S. at 157.  Rather, the Court held that, 
in light of eBay and Winter, an injunction should issue “only 
if the traditional four-factor test is satisfied” and “[n]o . . . 
thumb on the scales is warranted.”  Id.       
 
 Ferring argues that eBay does not apply to Lanham 
Act cases because it was decided in the patent context, which 
raises unique concerns not present in the Lanham Act 
context.
9
  See Ferring Br. 31-33.  Among other things, 
Ferring notes that patents “‘have the attributes of personal 
property,’” including “‘the right to exclude others from 
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention.’”  
eBay, 547 U.S. at 392 (quoting 35 U.S.C. §§ 261, 154(a)(1)).  
By contrast, the Lanham Act creates no corresponding 
property right, especially with regard to false advertising 
claims.  Lanham Act claims are also materially distinct from 
patent or copyright claims because, while injury arising from 
patent or copyright infringement can generally be measured 
in monetary terms by examining the “appropriation of a 
potential market for the patent invention or copyrighted 
work,” see David H. Bernstein & Andrew Gilden, No Trolls 
Barred: Trademark Injunctions After eBay, 99 Trademark 
Rep. 1037, 1055 (2009), injury to goodwill and reputation “is 
                                              
9
 In addition, although eBay addressed a permanent, rather 
than preliminary, injunction, this distinction is not significant.  
“The standard for a preliminary injunction is essentially the 
same as for a permanent injunction with the exception that the 
plaintiff must show a likelihood of success on the merits 
rather than actual success.”  Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of 
Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987); see also 
Flexible Lifeline Sys. v. Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d 989, 
996 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding that “eBay applies with equal 
force to preliminary injunction cases as it does to permanent 
injunction cases”).    
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real but difficult to measure in dollars and cents,” 5 J. Thomas 
McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition 
§ 30:47 (4th ed. 1996).  See also Abbott Labs, 971 F.2d at 16 
(noting that “it is virtually impossible to ascertain the precise 
economic consequences of intangible harms, such as damage 
to reputation and loss of goodwill, caused by [Lanham Act] 
violations”).   
 
 We are not persuaded by this argument.  The rationale 
of the eBay decision was not that patent cases are somehow 
unique, but rather, as stated supra, that “the decision whether 
to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the equitable 
discretion of the district courts, and that such discretion must 
be exercised consistent with traditional principles of equity, in 
patent disputes no less than in other cases governed by such 
standards.”  eBay, 547 U.S. at 394.  In addition, as noted 
supra, the Court in eBay suggested that a “major departure 
from the long tradition of equity practice” should be 
permitted only to the extent that “Congress intended such a 
departure.”  547 U.S. at 391-92.  It follows that a court is not 
free to depart from traditional principles of equity merely 
because it believes such a departure would further a statute’s 
policy goals, such as, in the case of Lanham Act claims, 
compensating plaintiffs for harms that may be difficult to 
quantify.  Rather, the text of the Lanham Act clearly evinces 
congressional intent to require courts to grant or deny 
injunctions according to traditional principles of equity.  See 
15 U.S.C § 1116(a).   
 
 Because a presumption of irreparable harm deviates 
from the traditional principles of equity, which require a 
movant to demonstrate irreparable harm, we hold that there is 
no presumption of irreparable harm afforded to parties 
seeking injunctive relief in Lanham Act cases.  Consistent 
with our holding, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
recently extended the eBay analysis to a trademark 
infringement claim, holding that the likelihood of irreparable 
injury may no longer be presumed from a showing of 
likelihood of success on the merits.  See Herb Reed Enters., 
LLC v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1242 (9th 
Cir. 2013).  The court noted that eBay and Winter “cast doubt 
on the validity of this court’s previous rule that the likelihood 
of ‘irreparable injury may be presumed from a showing of 
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likelihood of success on the merits of a trademark 
infringement claim.’”  Id. at 1248-49 (quoting Brookfield 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 
1066 (9th Cir. 1999)).  After summarizing the holdings of 
eBay and Winter, the court noted that following those cases, 
it “held that likely irreparable harm must be demonstrated to 
obtain a preliminary injunction in a copyright infringement 
case and that actual irreparable harm must be demonstrated to 
obtain a permanent injunction in a trademark infringement 
action.”  Id. at 1249 (citing Flexible Lifeline Sys. v. Precision 
Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 2011) and Reno Air 
Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1137-38 (9th 
Cir. 2006)).  The court concluded that its “imposition of the 
irreparable harm requirement for a permanent injunction in a 
trademark case applies with equal force in the preliminary 
injunction context” and held that “the eBay principle — that a 
plaintiff must establish irreparable harm — applies to a 
preliminary injunction in a trademark infringement case.”  Id.  
We agree with the holding and rationale of the Herb Reed 
court.
10
        
                                              
10
 Several other Courts of Appeals have held that the 
reasoning of eBay applies to the Lanham Act context and 
have acknowledged that eBay may call the use of a 
presumption of irreparable harm into doubt, although they 
have explicitly declined to decide the issue.  See, e.g., 
Swarovski Aktiengesellschaft v. Bldg. No. 19, Inc., 704 F.3d 
44, 53-55 (1st Cir. 2013) (noting that “we have so far 
declined to address whether eBay’s bar on ‘general’ or 
‘categorical’ rules includes the presumption of irreparable 
harm in trademark disputes” and declining to decide the issue 
because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a likelihood of 
success on the merits); Paulsson Geophysical Servs., Inc. v. 
Sigmar, 529 F.3d 303, 313 (5th Cir. 2008) (acknowledging 
that “whether a court may presume irreparable injury upon 
finding a likelihood of confusion in a trademark case” was “a 
difficult question considering the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
eBay,” but declining to answer because the facts of the case 
supported a finding of a substantial threat of irreparable injury 
if an injunction was not issued);  Axiom Worldwide, 522 F.3d 
at 1226-28 (observing that “a strong case can be made that 
eBay’s holding necessarily extends to the grant of preliminary 
injunctions under the Lanham Act,” but “declin[ing] to 
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 The Court’s decision in Winter, requiring that a 
plaintiff demonstrate a likelihood, rather than a possibility, of 
irreparable harm, further supports our conclusion.
11
  As the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has observed, if 
requiring a plaintiff to “demonstrate at least a possibility of 
irreparable harm[] is ‘too lenient,’ then surely a standard 
which presumes irreparable harm without requiring any 
showing at all is also ‘too lenient.’”  Flexible Lifeline, 654 
F.3d at 997.  Rather, injunctive relief is an “extraordinary 
remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that 
the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”  Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 
(emphasis added).  Presuming irreparable harm would relieve 
the plaintiff of her burden to make such a showing. 
 
                                                                                                     
address whether [a presumption of irreparable harm] is the 
equivalent of the categorical rules rejected by the Court in 
eBay”). 
11
 We note that before Winter, we had not treated the 
preliminary injunction irreparable harm requirement in a 
uniform manner, at times requiring a showing of a 
“possibility,” “probability,” or “potential” for irreparable 
harm.  See, e.g., Presbytery of N.J. of Orthodox Presbyterian 
Church v. Florio, 40 F.3d 1454, 1458 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding 
that the plaintiff “failed to demonstrate the possibility of 
immediate and irreparable harm”); Furlong v. Gudknecht, 808 
F.2d 233, 234 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting that the district court 
considered, inter alia, the “potential for irreparable injury 
absent temporary relief” in determining whether to grant a 
preliminary injunction); United Tel. Workers, AFL-CIO v. 
W. Union Corp., 771 F.2d 699, 703 (3d Cir. 1985) (“In 
deciding whether to provide preliminary relief, the district 
court must consider the probability of irreparable injury to the 
moving party in the absence of such relief . . . .”); United 
States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 211 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting that 
the “factors which guide the exercise of the courts’ equitable 
discretion” in granting or denying a request for preliminary 
injunctive relief include “the probability of irreparable injury 
to the moving party in the absence of relief”).  However, in 
light of Winter, parties seeking a preliminary injunction are 
now required to demonstrate that “irreparable injury is likely 
in the absence of an injunction.”  Winter, 555 U.S. at 22.   
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 In addition, “Winter tells us that, at minimum, we must 
consider whether irreparable injury is likely in the absence of 
an injunction, we must balance the competing claims of 
injury, and we must pay particular regard for the public 
consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of 
injunction.”  Salinger, 607 F.3d at 79 (quotation marks 
omitted).  A presumption of irreparable harm that functions as 
an automatic or general grant of an injunction is inconsistent 
with these principles of equity.  See id.; see also Munaf v. 
Green, 553 U.S. 674, 689-90 (2008) (noting that an injunction 
is an “extraordinary and drastic remedy” that “is never 
awarded as of right” (quotation marks omitted)).  
 
 For these reasons, we hold that a party seeking a 
preliminary injunction in a Lanham Act case is not entitled to 
a presumption of irreparable harm but rather is required to 
demonstrate that she is likely to suffer irreparable harm if an 
injunction is not granted.           
 
D. 
 
Although we agree with the District Court that Ferring 
was not entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm, we 
must also review the District Court’s finding that Ferring 
failed to make a showing of likelihood of irreparable harm 
without the presumption.   
 
 In evaluating whether Ferring demonstrated that it 
would suffer real, irreparable harm in the absence of an 
injunction, the District Court noted that Dr. Silverberg agreed 
he misstated the Black Box warning in the first webcast, but 
removed the statement during the second webcast, and 
certified to the District Court that he will never make that 
statement in the future.  App. 12, 237.  The District Court also 
found it significant that Dr. Silverberg certified that, at the 
request of Watson, in future presentations concerning 
Crinone, he will make only specified statements as to the 
efficacy of Endometrin for women thirty-five years of age or 
older, all in accordance with Endometrin’s package insert.  
App. 12, 240.  The District Court noted that there was no 
showing that the allegedly false information contained in the 
webcasts is still available online to be accessed by consumers.  
App. 12.  For these reasons, the District Court found that 
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Ferring did not produce evidence sufficient to prove that it 
was harmed, or that the harm was irreparable and could only 
be cured by a preliminary injunction.  App. 12.   
 
 Ferring disputes the District Court’s finding, arguing 
that it did in fact present evidence of irreparable harm in the 
form of a declaration by Dr. Angeline N. Beltsos (the 
“Beltsos Declaration”), a licensed reproductive 
endocrinologist.  App. 144-48.  The declaration stated, inter 
alia, that:  (1) Dr. Beltsos and other doctors would be less 
likely to prescribe a drug if they believed it contained a Black 
Box warning; (2) Dr. Beltsos and other doctors would be less 
likely to prescribe a drug if patients in the marketplace 
generally preferred another drug; and (3) Dr. Beltsos and 
other doctors would be less likely to prescribe a drug if it was 
not effective for a particular age group.  App. 146-47.       
  
 Ferring also argues that the District Court erred in 
failing to analyze the specific harm caused by Watson’s 
claims regarding the superiority of Crinone over Endometrin 
in patient preference surveys.  Ferring asserts that this is 
particularly unjust because Watson is still making these 
statements, as evidenced by the Declaration of Lynne Amato, 
Watson’s Vice President of Global Brand Marketing, 
submitted on December 3, 2012, stating that Watson’s slide 
presentation now has a “correct slide stating that the survey 
was of women who had used both Crinone and Endometrin.”  
App. 303.
12
    
 
 We hold that the District Court did not clearly err in 
finding that Ferring failed to demonstrate irreparable harm.  
We, like the District Court, find it significant that Dr. 
                                              
12
 As evidence that Watson claims to have stopped making 
these allegedly false statements but actually continues to do 
so, Ferring states that one of Watson’s sales representatives 
has already been caught making an allegedly false statement 
regarding Endometrin’s efficacy in women over thirty-five 
years old in a note.  App. 140-43.  However, the note at issue 
was written on November 7, 2012, before Ferring even filed 
for a preliminary injunction and almost a month before Dr. 
Silverberg’s certification to the court.  See App. 141.  
Accordingly, this is not a persuasive argument.     
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Silverberg has certified to the court that he will not make the 
Black Box statement in the future, and it was removed from 
the 9:00 webcast.  App. 12, 237.  Dr. Silverberg also certified 
that he will make age efficacy statements about Endometrin 
only in accordance with the product’s package insert.  App. 
240.  We see no evidence that the allegedly false statements 
are still available to consumers.  Although Ferring argues that 
only Dr. Silverberg, and not Watson itself, has promised not 
to make these offending statements in the future, Ferring has 
adduced no evidence that there is any risk that any Watson 
representative will make such statements, especially in light 
of the fact that Watson has conceded that certain of these 
statements were inaccurate, and that all of the statements at 
issue here were made by Dr. Silverberg.  See App. 6-8.     
  
 We also hold that the Beltsos Declaration does not 
sufficiently demonstrate irreparable harm such that the 
District Court’s finding was clear error.13  The Beltsos 
Declaration is speculative, containing statements by Dr. 
Beltsos that the considerations of whether drugs are preferred 
by certain patients or are considered effective for a particular 
age group “may influence” her decision and the decisions of 
other doctors as to which drugs they prescribe.  App. 146-48.  
Dr. Beltsos stated that she and other doctors “would be less 
likely” to prescribe the non-effective and non-preferred drugs, 
but this too is speculation, as she does not assert that she or 
                                              
13
 Ferring argues that the District Court erred in failing to 
consider the Beltsos Declaration in its irreparable harm 
analysis.  We acknowledge that it would have been preferable 
for the District Court to have explicitly referenced the Beltsos 
Declaration in its decision, especially with regard to Ferring’s 
request for corrective advertising.  But we observe that 
Ferring did not raise, before this Court, any arguments 
specifically referencing its request for corrective advertising.  
In any event, “[a] party seeking a mandatory preliminary 
injunction that will alter the status quo bears a particularly 
heavy burden in demonstrating its necessity.”  Acierno v. 
New Castle Cnty., 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994).  In light 
of this heavy burden, and the fact that the harm described in 
the Beltsos Declaration is purely speculative, we hold that the 
District Court’s alleged failure to consider the Declaration 
was, at most, harmless error.   
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any other doctors have prescribed Endometrin less frequently 
in light of the allegedly false statements made by Dr. 
Silverberg.  App. 146-48.   
 
 Ferring also argues that a Lanham Act defendant 
cannot automatically moot a case simply by ending its 
infringing conduct, but rather must irrefutably demonstrate 
that the offending conduct has been totally reformed, and this 
burden is a “heavy” one.  Ferring Br. 38-39 (citing authority).  
However, whether a case should be dismissed on mootness 
grounds is a materially distinct inquiry from a determination 
as to whether a plaintiff has demonstrated irreparable harm.  
Whether a defendant’s conduct has ceased is certainly a 
relevant consideration in making the latter determination, and 
the District Court did not err in considering and crediting Dr. 
Silverberg’s certifications that the allegedly false statements 
would not be repeated.       
 
 Accordingly, we hold that the District Court did not 
clearly err in finding that Ferring failed to demonstrate that it 
would likely suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 
preliminary injunctive relief.  Absent a showing of irreparable 
harm, a plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief, even if the 
other three elements are found.  See NutraSweet, 176 F.3d at 
153.  
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ferring’s motion 
for a preliminary injunction.  We will, therefore, affirm the 
District Court’s order.    
 
